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An international perspective on the
determinants of local government
fragmentation
Juan Luis Gomez-Reino and
Jorge Martinez-Vazquez

1.

INTRODUCTION

Subnational government fragmentation, associated with the small size of
jurisdictions to take advantage of economies of scale in service delivery, is
a commonly perceived problem in many decentralized systems around the
globe. Subnational government fragmentation typically takes the form of
an excessive number of subnational jurisdictions at any level of govern
ment, most often at the local or municipal level. But fragmentation may
also have other manifestations, including in particular the number of tiers
or levels of subnational governments.
As is to be expected, however, the degree of jurisdictional fragmentation
varies widely from country to country and through different regions of the
world. In order to examine the extent and determinants of jurisdictional
fragmentation in this chapter, we will use the most recent available infor
mation for a sample of 197 countries. The analysis of the raw data shows
considerable diversity in terms of jurisdictional fragmentation. In terms of
the number of tiers of government (in addition to the central government
tier), as shown in Figure 2.1, in our sample 10 countries report having four
tiers of governments, while 50 countries report three. On the other hand,
more than 50 percent of the countries in our sample have only two levels
of government, including countries vastly different in terms of population,
ethnic composition, etc.
Equally, the absolute number of subnational jurisdictions per country
ranges widely in the sample, from a minimum of 0 in the tiny island
nation of Kiribati (only a central level government) to a maximum of over
240,000 in India (including the Gram panchayat or village level of govern
ment). The median value of the number of subnational jurisdictions is
situated at 194.
8

An international perspective on local government fragmentation

9

120

101

100 -

80
60

40

,

50

20 --

10
f

i

i

i

Subnational government tiers per country

50-100

100-200 200-300 300-400 400-500 500-1000

>1000

Number of subnational jurisdictions per country

Figure 2.2 offers information on the distribution of the sample in terms
of the absolute number of jurisdictions per country. A total of 42 coun
tries in our sample report more than one thousand subnational jurisdic
tions including all subnational tiers of government. A similar number of
countries (51) report less than 50 jurisdictions in total.
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Correlations: number of jurisdictions and selected sample
variables
Number
jurisdictions

Number of jurisdictions
Population
Area
Gini coefficient
GDP pc
Human Development
Index

1
0.74
0.25
-0.04
-0.02
-0.01

Pop.

Area

1
0.44
0.02
-0.06
-0.03

1
0.09
0.08
0.09

Gini
coefficient

1
-0.48
-0.41

GDP HDI
pc

1
0.76

As is suggested by the simple correlations presented in Table 2.1, the
total number of jurisdictions is strongly correlated with the country's
population, but, and a bit surprisingly, only weakly so with the geographi
cal area of the entire country. As a rough initial approximation to what
other factors may play a role in determining the number of subnational
jurisdictions per country, in Table 2.1 we also show the simple correlation
coefficients of the absolute number of subnational jurisdictions with GDP
per capita, the Gini measures of income inequality, and the human devel
opment index. None of these variables appears to be correlated with the
number of subnational jurisdictions across countries.
The issue of jurisdictional fragmentation is one of considerable current
policy relevance. The problem of suboptimal scale, real or perceived,
continues to lead to significant policy actions in many countries around
the world in terms of forced amalgamation programs or simply to the
elimination of a variety of subnational governments, as witnessed by
the very recent decisions taken by the governments of Greece and Italy
in a drive to reduce public sector deficits. These programs of jurisdic
tional consolidation across the world could be questioned considering
the limited (and service-specific) evidence on economies of scale on local
service delivery available from the empirical literature (Gomez-Reino and
Martinez-Vazquez, 2011). Forced consolidation programs appear to have
yielded mixed results in terms of cost savings (Dollery and Robotti, 2009;
Dowding and Mergoupis, 2003).1 The international experience seems to
show that many other countries around the world, often times facing
stilt political difficulties,2 are opting instead for adapting to high levels of
jurisdictional fragmentation while encouraging the creation of new insti
tutional modes for service delivery (e.g. special districts, inter-municipal
cooperation, etc.).
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The main questions addressed in this chapter are the identification
of the main determinants of jurisdictional fragmentation as presently
observed across countries and how well those findings line up with the
predictions of the expanded standard model of optimal jurisdiction size.
To our knowledge, to date, there does not exist a rigorous study analyzing
the cross-country determinants of fragmentation in the way this issue has
been previously analyzed for some particular countries.
At the outset, country fixed effects can be expected to loom large and
powerful. Each country's own history has been conditioned by a myriad
of details, including colonial legacies, geography or ethnic and linguistic
fragmentation, which are likely to have contributed to heterogeneous
levels of fragmentation. These factors could all be summarized in what is
often termed the long shadow or the "dead hand" of history. Indeed, some
countries may still have the same vertical structure of government that
they had many decades ago. But there are also many countries that have
changed their governmental structures over the years. So in this chapter
we would like to find out what may be the common determinants that
have led to those changes, and also perhaps to better understand if those
common determinants can be used to explain why other countries have
changed so little.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 2 we offer a
simple extension of the conventional model for optimal jurisdiction size.
In section 3 we review the literature on government fragmentation and
its impact. In section 4 we outline the empirical model proposed for the
analysis of jurisdictional fragmentation. In section 5 we present the results
from our estimations. We conclude in section 6.

2.

A SIMPLE MODEL OF OPTIMAL JURISDICTION
SIZE

The standard economic model by Oates (1972) defines the problem of
optimal jurisdictional size in the provision of services as consisting of
two main tradeoffs. First, the tradeoff exists between the welfare gains
expected from smaller governments (better placed to match expenditure
allocation to local preferences) and economies of scale (or associated
lower average costs) expected from the delivery of services at larger juris
dictional sizes. On that basis, optimal size and therefore equilibrium in
the number of jurisdictions would be reached when the difference between
the marginal welfare gains from more efficient provision and the marginal
costs derived from foregone economies of scale is maximized. The second
critical tradeoff determining optimal jurisdictional size is that between the
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closer accountability offered by smaller governments to their citizens and
the higher management, administrative, and information costs associated
with multiple jurisdictions for service delivery.
In the mathematical appendix to his seminal work on fiscal decen
tralization, Oates (1972) derives the equilibrium quantity that minimizes
the welfare loss incurred from providing a common level of production
(as opposed to that preferred by single individuals) for a given group of
people. Therefore, his solution does not incorporate economies of scale
or the role of accountability. In this section, we provide an extension of
Oates's (1972) basic model using Buchanan's (1965) formulation of a
theory of clubs and Alesina and Spolaore's (2003) uni-dimensional linear
model where losses of welfare are measured as the distance between the
individual's preferred consumption level of the public good G and the
level provided as a result of the collective decision. Otherwise we maintain
the customary assumptions of a constant and immobile population, zero
transaction costs for collective decision-making and that the financing of
the public good provision is efficiency-neutral (i.e. lump sum taxation).
We assume that individuals have a quasi-linear utility function of the
form:
Ui = yi + ri(DGi)
where DG| is equal to the difference, in absolute value, between the level
of public good provided and the level that would maximize individual
welfare, for each individual. Following Oates's original formulation, the
sum of the differences between the level of public good provided and that
which would maximize the individual's utility is likely to increase with the
size of the jurisdiction (measured in population terms), and so,
DGj = DG (G(N), Gf)
Thus, the larger the difference between the level of public good provided
and the individual's equilibrium quantity (Gf, signaling the heterogene
ous preferences), the larger the loss in welfare, and the larger the amount
by which overall individual utility would be reduced. Additionally, such
distance to the individual optimum will be a function of the size of the
jurisdiction in population terms N, as the level of G is a collective deci
sion that will vary with population size. For simplicity, we assume that
the utility decreases in an increasing way from larger distances from the
individual's optimal level of G, and that equal distances to the individual
optimum, be G above or below G*, translate into identical losses in
welfare:
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dUi IdDG, < 0. and d2U, IdDGt 2 > 0
dUi IdDGl = dUt ISDG2, for each DG1 = G* +

and DG2 = Gf-%

We define t (the tax price paid for the public good) as equal to the average
cost of provision, or total cost (C) of production divided by the size of
the population served. In turn, the total cost is defined as a function of the
quantity produced:
t = CIN; where C = C{G)
As the size of the jurisdiction (N) increases, the average cost of provision
of the public good (G) decreases, improving the individual's welfare level.
The individual's utility from lower taxes (or average production costs),
increases however in a decreasing way, represented by the positive value of
the second derivative:
dUi Idt < 0, andd2 (/,. Idt2 > 0
An additional member to the jurisdiction adds another person to the col
lective decision-making mechanism for the determination of G. Thus the
sum of the distances between individual preferences of G (G,*) and the
effective level finally provided increases, decreasing overall utility:
IdUj/dN < 0.
The budget restriction of the individual is:
A/,. = y, + t
Thus the individual's income (assumed exogenously determined) is spent
on consumption of the private good y and the public good G for which
he pays a price equal to t. From the individual maximization problem we
obtain the individual's most preferred level of public good provision (Gf),
which is the level of public good that would maximize the individual's
utility given a set of prices.
Lastly, the transformation function for the economy is of the form
F(G,y, N) = 0,
meaning that the production cost depends on the quantity produced and
on the quantity of private good required that has to be surrendered for
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its production. We further assume that the production cost for the public
good presents economies of scale up to a certain range, after which it
exhibits decreasing returns to scale later, thus giving us a U-shaped cost
function. This assumption is later on relaxed and its implications are
explored further.
The individual faces the following maximization problem:
Max [v, + U, (DGjiGiN), (?•)]
s. t. Mi — y, + t
By assuming a quasi-linear utility function, social welfare changes are
equal to the summation of changes in welfare of all the individuals
due to variations in t. Thus, if the government behaves as a benevo
lent planner, it will try to maximize social welfare, defined as the sum
of all individual utilities (again assuming the quasi-linear form of the
utility functions), solving for the optimal size of the group for service
provision.
Thus we have a social welfare function (SW):
StV=lUi = !>>,. + It/,. (DG,(G(AO, Gf)
with the constraint for the entire economy given by the transformation
function:
F(G, y, N) = 0
The optimal jurisdictional size can now be found from maximizing:
£ = !>•,. + I.{Ul(DGi(G(N'), G*i)} - IF(G, >>,, N)
with the first order conditions (FOC):
d£/dy, = 1 - X(dF/dy) = 0
d£IdG = X{(dt/ /dZ)G,)* (dDGJdG)) - X(dF/dG) = 0
d£/dN = I {(dUi IdDG.)* (dDGi IdG)* (dG/dN)} - X(dFldN) = 0
from which we obtain
I(0t/,. /dDG)*(dDG/dG) = (dFldG)l(dFldy)
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This says that the sum of the marginal rates of substitution between the
public good (G) and the private good (Y) equals the marginal rate of
transformation between the public and the private good:
I MRS' GY = MRT C Y
which is the well-known Samuelson condition, also reached in Buchanan's
(1965) theory of clubs.
The optimal size of N can also be obtained from the FOC as:
11 (d UJdDG,)*(dDG,/dG)*(dG/dN) } = (dF/dN)/2(dF/dy)
also known as the "membership condition" in Buchanan's (1965) theory
of clubs.
We can re-write the equilibrium condition as:
I MRS' NY = MRT N Y
where the RHS is the change in the average cost of provision from adding
additional individuals to the population sharing the cost of provision. So
we have that
MRT Nv = d(C/N)/dN = -ON2
The optimal N* is given by:
N* = L(-CI(LMRS' NY ))
Thus, the optimal size of the jurisdiction is positively related to the size of
the economies of scale and negatively related to the welfare costs derived
from heterogeneous preferences.
This mode! can now be easily expanded to take into account prefer
ences for political representation/accountability, which, although not
considered either in Oates's (1972) model, have the potential to signifi
cantly affect optimal jurisdiction size. Arguably, as population increases
(i.e. jurisdictional size), the relative power of the individual to influence
government decisions (i.e. political accountability) is diluted (Seabright,
1996; Tommasi and Weinschelbaum, 1999). Additionally, in the absence
of a decentralized system of government, local political representatives
may simply be central government appointees with vertical accountability
to their superiors but no horizontal accountability to the jurisdiction's
residents. But even if political representatives are elected locally, they
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may be transfer-dependent and not enjoy sufficient fiscal autonomy
to significantly determine expenditure and revenue patterns in their
local governments. Higher accountability of local officials may also be
increased by their physical proximity to the citizens (Ostrom et al., 1993)
and by citizens' ability to compare government's performance against
other local governments engaging in yardstick competition (Besley and
Coate, 2003).
We can model accountability by introducing a new variable for politi
cal accountability (P), affecting the way preferences are reflected into a
government's level of provision of the public good G. In particular we
now define:
DG = DG((G(N), G% P), whereby
( dDG/dP ) < 0
So the new representative individual's utility function would be:
Uj = y,- + Ui {DG(G(N), Gf), P).
Note that P is defined as P = P(N,D,FA,CP)y where D represents the exist
ence of a decentralized government with locally elected representatives,
FA reflects the degree of fiscal autonomy, and CP is a measure of citizen
representation in government decision-making (such as the existence of
participatory budgeting systems, etc.). Since an increase in jurisdictional
size is related to lower individual capacity to influence the decisions of the
politicians, we have (8P/dN) < 0.
The maximization problem faced by the benevolent planner of the
jurisdiction now becomes:
Max £ = Y+lUi [DG(G(N), Gf), P(N)) - X(F(G, Y,N)]
And as before we can obtain the Samuelson condition from the FOC
IMRS'0 Y = MRT'g

y

and Buchanan's "membership condition" as
I MRS*y = MRTNy
where the superscript P denotes the marginal rate of substitution once
political accountability is included in the individual utility function.
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By definition, as (dU/dP) > 0 and (dPIdN) < 0, then (dU/dP)*
(<dPIdN) < 0. AsZ{(dU(/dDG)* (dDGIdG)* (dGldN) is, by definition, nega
tive (loss in social welfare from the addition of one more member to the
jurisdiction), with the addition of (dt/, ldP)*(dPldN) we conclude that
HMRS'fiyl > /IMRSy
The absolute value of the loss in social welfare from one additional
member to the jurisdiction is greater once we include a preference for
political accountability in the individual's welfare function. Not only does
utility decrease due to the addition of a new consumer's welfare loss in the
form of G-G* but now citizens also lose individual capacity to influence
the decision over G.
Finally, solving for the optimal N, we obtain:
N* = G-CPLMRSfiy)
From the above we can conclude that N* < N*. That is, the optimal
jurisdictional size for the provision of the public good is smaller once we
introduce preferences for political accountability in the individual's utility
function.
In summary the creation of a new level of government would be theo
retically justified if overall welfare is improved (considering losses from
economies of scale, gains from tailoring preferences to citizens, and
preferences for political accountability) by assigning the provision of
public goods and services from the central (or other subnational) level
of government to a new jurisdiction.

3.

A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON
GOVERNMENT FRAGMENTATION AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS

Although this chapter is about the determinants of jurisdictional fragmen
tation as opposed to the impact of fragmentation, it is important to briefly
note this latter issue. In reality, the level of government fragmentation has
potentially important implications for an array of issues. So we start this
review section by looking at some of those issues. Next, we review how
in reality fragmentation has been measured in the literature. Third and
last, we review what is known so far on the determinants of jurisdictional
fragmentation.
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On the Impact of Jurisdictional Fragmentation

From a theoretical angle, public choice scholars have associated subnational government competition, supposedly enhanced by jurisdictional
fragmentation, with the containment of bureaucracy and a Leviathan
public sector. Greater competition in this view leads to an overall more
efficient government with essentially leaner budgets (Niskanen, 1975;
Brennan and Buchanan, 1980). The theoretical foundations for the poten
tial benefits to be derived from subnational government fragmentation
can be traced back to Tiebout's (1956) seminal proposition that citizens
"vote with their feet" and choose the mix of services and taxes that best
represent their preferences. Assuming adequate supply of local govern
ments (which assumes away the problem of fragmentation but implies it),
a Tiebout equilibrium is reached when each citizen maximizes the welfare
obtained from the mix of goods and services provided by the local gov
ernment, net of tax payments. Thus, a sufficient number of governments
offering distinguishable tax and expenditure packages would be required
for this efficient sorting of individuals. From this point of view, a certain
level of fragmentation would be efficiency-enhancing, since a diversity of
preferences requires a diversity of government service packages.
Empirical evidence on this issue is mixed. Some early papers, for
example Sjoquist (1982), find that expenditures per capita in metropolitan
regions of the U.S. decrease as the number of jurisdictions increases. More
recently, Feld et al. (2003) find no evidence that fragmentation affects the
size (in terms of expenditure budgets) of Swiss cantons. Earlier contribu
tions of the literature have tended to suggest that augmenting the number
of governments may lead to increases in the overall size of the public sector.
This is likely to occur especially if economies of scale in public administra
tion are foregone with greater decentralization (Oates, 1991), or if citizens'
control over local bureaucracies translates into a wider range of services
being provided (Zax, 1989). Among other reasons, this "larger public
sector" result has been justified under the assumption of a lower quality of
bureaucrats at the local government level, leading to poorer expenditure
management and higher costs for services (Prud'homme, 1995). Another
aspect affecting overall expenditures is public employment. In a recent
cross-country study, Martinez-Vazquez and Yao (2009) find that total
public sector employment grows with fiscal decentralization, as increases
in employment at the subnational level more than offset declines at the
central government level. In practice, recent government policy measures
across the world have been inspired by the belief that higher jurisdic
tional fragmentation leads to larger expenditures. For example, pressure
to reduce government spending seemed to be behind recent drives for
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municipal amalgamation in Canada (Sancton, 2008). Similarly, the recent
drives toward the elimination/forced amalgamation of local government
in eurozone countries such as Greece and Italy have been based on the
same beliefs that subnational government fragmentation is associated
with larger expenditures.
From an equity point of view, higher fragmentation has been suggested
to lead to the separation of tax bases among rich and poor. Richer areas
(such as suburban residential areas) have a clear incentive to separate from
impoverished urban areas that are subsidized with the revenues collected
from their tax bases. The end result of such motivated fragmentation may
be higher inequalities in the provision of services. A highly fragmented
local government level may also lead to more self-centered governments
in terms of policy issues, reducing the incentives for coordination among
jurisdictions to maximize overall welfare levels (Lewis, 1998). Earlier
contributions seem to show, however, that higher income voters may be
supportive of redistributive programs if they expect to obtain long term
utility gains, such as overall increases in property values in the jurisdiction
(Martinez-Vazquez, 1981).
The literature is fairly rich in contributions exploring the effect of frag
mentation on economic growth and urban sprawl. For example. Nelson
and Foster (1999) argue that in the framework of metropolitan areas in the
U.S., as decision-making becomes more fragmented (more local govern
ments are present), growth in personal income declines. This is related to
the fact that annexation of suburban areas is largely behind the increase
in income growth of metropolitan areas, which are favored by their con
solidation with affluent suburbs. Measures of sprawl used in the literature,
very concentrated in the U.S. experience on the other hand, include popu
lation density (as an indication of low-density development), the percent
age of dwellings in single-unit detached houses, or housing units per square
kilometer. In one of the few studies that analyzes the plausible reverse cau
sation between fragmentation and urban sprawl, Razin and Rosentraub
(2000) conclude that residential sprawl impacts positively on fragmenta
tion, but fragmentation does not have a predictable effect on sprawl.
Stansel (2005) finds a direct relationship between the number of local
governments in the U.S. relative to population, and the level of economic
growth. If greater fragmentation is related to greater decentralization, this
finding is related to a larger literature on decentralization and growth.1
On the Measurement of Jurisdictional Fragmentation

The concept of jurisdictional fragmentation is not easily made opera
tional. The literature has favored overall a measure of the number of local
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governments relative to the size, either in terms of land area or in terms
of population (Nelson, 1992). However, the range of overlapping authori
ties over the same territory (as ultimately, the institutional form chosen to
deliver public services may take several forms) adds an extra complication
to the estimation of government fragmentation levels. Optimal govern
ment size, as Ostrom et al. (1999) argued, may depend on the nature of the
public good provided and not just on the preferences of local consumers,
leading to "polycentrism", or a system of multiple collective decision
making mechanisms. Socio-spatial studies have termed this process "state
rescaling", a redefinition of the role of government at all levels, including
the involvement of non-governmental agencies in public service delivery,
the allocation of further competencies through decentralization to subnational levels of government, and the assumption of former national
competencies by supra-national institutions. In line with this argument,
Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev (2008) find that the trend towards decen
tralization observed over the last decades has not affected, on average, the
size of government, and offer empirical evidence of significant and posi
tive relationships between globalization, decentralization and government
size.
On the Determinants of Jurisdictional Fragmentation

Generally, there is a shortage of contributions exploring the determinants
of the observed high fragmentation of local governments across the world.
Most of this evidence comes from studies for the U.S. with some experi
ences also from Canada and Australia. In what follows we review that
evidence categorized by type of determinant.
Do heterogeneous local preferences lead to greater fragmentation?

As briefly discussed in the introduction, Oates's (1972) seminal contribu
tion proposed a fundamental tradeoff in the determination of government
jurisdiction size between the efficiency gains attained from tailoring local
public good provision to local preferences, which is likely enhanced by
government fragmentation, and economies of scale in service delivery,
which is largely hurt by government fragmentation. We examine first
what the empirical evidence is that heterogeneous preferences are actually
behind the observed fragmentation of local governments.
The measurement of preferences has traditionally been more difficult
than the measurement of costs. However, there have been some successes
in the attempt to make operational the heterogeneity of preferences in
the economic literature. In his seminal contribution to the study of the
determinants of government fragmentation in the U.S., Nelson (1992)
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shows that the number of jurisdictions is positively correlated with the
degree of heterogeneity of individual preferences, measured by income
dispersion and age dispersion (i.e. more income and age dispersion leads
to a higher number of governments).4 This finding aligns well with Oates's
(1972) decentralization postulates. Nelson's analysis uses all types of gov
ernments from the U.S. Census, including both elected general purpose
governments (counties, cities, municipalities, etc.) and special districts.
He finds that the correlation between heterogeneity and fragmentation is
stronger in the case of special districts than for general purpose govern
ments. Since, in general, special districts are easier to create and modify,
the findings lend support to the argument that heterogeneity of local
preferences leads to smaller jurisdictions.
In a somewhat related fashion, using a sample of Californian cities,
Musso (2001) finds that more affluent communities (with income as a
proxy for diverse preferences) in fast-growing counties are more likely
to form new cities. Conversely, Burns (1994) argues that changes in the
level of access and quality of local services do not explain local govern
ment formation, but instead tax avoidance and racial exclusion are found
to be the most significant determinants. In line with Burns's findings,
Martinez-Vazquez, Rider, and Walker (1997) find that increasing racial
heterogeneity of a state population increases the number of school dis
tricts, supposedly in order to satisfy their preference for disassociation.
A related line of work has linked heterogeneity in preferences to further
decentralization, which, of course, does not necessarily mean further frag
mentation. Shelton (2007), using data from a wide sample of countries,
finds that heterogeneity in preferences (measured by an index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization) leads to further decentralization, measured
as the share of local government expenditure in total government size.
Decentralization is greater, Shelton shows, in the education and health
sector, where one is more likely to find higher diversity of preferences due
to social and demographic factors.
Do economies of scale in service delivery lead to less fragmentation?

The evidence of the presence of economies of scale in the delivery of
certain public services is solid and largely non controversial, although
not always well understood in political and even policy circles. In a recent
meta-analysis study involving the evidence collected in many previous
studies, Gomez-Reino and Martinez-Vazquez (2011) conclude that educa
tion, urban transportation, garbage collection and water and sanitation, in
that order, are the services that display the largest potential for economies
of scale. Although the theoretical case that the presence of economies
of scale should lead to less fragmentation is a solid one, the available
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empirical evidence on this link is quite scarce. Nevertheless the real, or
otherwise perceived, presence of substantial economies of scale has led
to important policy decisions involving the forced amalgamation of local
governments in a large number of countries, many of them in Europe.
These policies by themselves offer some sort of an exogenous link between
economies of scale and jurisdictional fragmentation. However, analytical
evidence on this link between economies of scale and fragmentation is very
scarce or non-existent. This, we believe, is due to the difficulties of meas
uring economies of scale in a sample of countries, which may be the best
setting to explore the importance of this phenomenon versus other forces
as determinants of fragmentation. The difficulties of measuring economies
of scale consistently across countries are addressed below in the discussion
of our empirical model.
Economies of scope and demands for local accountability

A second major tradeoff critical in the definition of the optimal juris
dictional size is that between administrative costs and local government
accountability.5 If economies of scope are present, the joint delivery, for
example, of solid waste collection and water services by a supra-local level
of government offers cost savings over their separate provision by two
or more local governments. This consolidation of services would reduce
fragmentation but it may also decrease accountability of governments
to citizens. Evidence of economies of scope exists, especially for private
sector production, but it is scant with reference to local government pro
duction processes. Sharing production inputs was shown to be a source of
scope economies in the health care services sector (Grosskopf et al., 1995;
Dollery and Fleming, 2006). Equally, Callan and Thomas (2001), in their
estimation of a multi-product cost function for municipal waste services,
find evidence of significant cost savings from the joint provision of recy
cling and disposal services; whereas Wolff (2004) argues that substantial
economies of scope are found in the integrated management of river basin
systems in the U.S., as opposed to functional specialization. Although
scarce, this empirical evidence extends across very different local govern
ment services, providing some grounds to expect lower fragmentation of
government due to the cost savings offered by joint production.
Can demand for greater political accountability lead to higher frag
mentation? Several dimensions of the concept of political accountability
need to be distinguished. We may define political accountability as the
voters' capacity to influence the election (and actions) of their local repre
sentatives (Seabright, 1996). Such ability is expected to affect the political
responsiveness to local preferences in the mix of public goods and services
provided. This responsiveness is largely dependent on fiscal authority
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aspects such as whether powers to spend and tax have been devolved
to subnational governments. It also depends on whether elections are
being held at the subnational tiers of government and on the quality of
the election systems. Thus, for heterogeneous preferences to lead to dis
tinguishable mixes of public goods provided across jurisdictions, certain
institutional foundations must be in place linking citizens with policy
makers.
The expected greater responsiveness of representatives from smaller more fragmented - jurisdictions to the preferences of their constituents
is not an aspect explored by Oates in the theory of optimal jurisdictional
size. His model is anchored in a "direct democracy system", whereby local
citizens "vote" effectively on the level of public good to be provided.
If representative democracy models are the setting for public good
provision, then the principal-agent aspects of the relationship between
constituents and representatives come into play. In this regard, Tommasi
and Weinschelbaum (1999) identify four channels through which smaller
jurisdictions are able to exert improved control over their political rep
resentatives (and thus ensure their priorities are acted upon). First, in
line with Olson's (1965) theory of collective action, smaller jurisdictions
reduce the incentives to free-riding (which is rendered more visible in
smaller groups). Second, the existence of yardstick competition introduces
additional benchmarks for political performance not easy to manipulate
by local representatives. Linked to this aspect, policy diffusion models
(Berry and Berry, 1990) would argue that local experimentation and the
diffusion of best practices across jurisdictions may also introduce incen
tives and benchmarks for government performance. A third channel is
the fact that physical proximity to local representatives allows easier
access to them (i.e. reduced transaction costs) even when demands are not
related to policy changes but simply to quick, expedited action on issues of
citizens' interest.6 In a game theoretic setting, physical proximity increases
the probability of interacting in multiple venues, which allows for oppor
tunities for punishment (Tommasi and Weinschelbaum, 1999) and thus
introduces incentives for politicians to comply with citizens' demands.7
It is important to distinguish among these possible determinants of juris
dictional fragmentation if we attempt to explain the mounting anecdotal
evidence of citizens' resistance to jurisdictional consolidation in the pres
ence of nearly identical preferences for public goods and certain potential
for economies of scale.
These aspects may be more important than any perceived gains on the
(statistical) importance of individual votes in smaller jurisdictions. Even
in small constituencies, the probability that a single vote will be decisive
is minute.8
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Such demand for political accountability may not even translate into
greater citizen participation in government, even though proximity to
representatives may reduce the cost of collecting information about local
policies. Although direct citizen involvement in participatory planning,
budgeting or evaluation process may not depend on the level of govern
ment analyzed, the use of citizen satisfaction surveys does seem to assist
budget development processes (Jordan and Hackbart, 1999; Melkers and
Willoughby, 2005), informing governments' decisions on new expenditure
programs (Riverbank and Kelly, 2006). Along those lines, there seems to
be substantial evidence from international surveys that residents show
higher levels of satisfaction from the services received from local gov
ernments than those received from the central government (CIS, several
years, or Dasgupta et al. (2009) for the case of Indonesia).
The literature on performance budgeting provides an alternative avenue
to explore how accountable and responsive local governments are to
citizens' preferences and whether size affects the level of accountability.
By explicitly defining indicators and performance benchmarks in their
budgets, governments not only change the technology of accountability,
but may offer a critical instrument to evaluate how close government
actions are to local preferences. A recent review of the literature by Gomez
and Willoughby (2008) shows that the widespread implementation of
performance budgeting measures at different levels of government in the
U.S. does not seem to have translated into significant changes in inter- or
intra-sectoral allocation. This may reflect a lack of flexibility in adjust
ing expenditure patterns to local preferences due to largely committed,
politics-driven budgets, or simply that actual budgets may be closer to
what is desirable. But, it could also be a reflection of how time-consuming
it is for citizens to collect and process government budgetary information
and act upon it. In this direction, Melkers and Willoughby (2001) found
that in the U.S., budget officials at the state level were more positive about
the impact of results-based budgeting on states' budgetary appropriations
if the performance measurement was a requirement of the legislature (and
not just of the executive).
Thus far there is no clear evidence that the impact of performance meas
urement on budget formulation is different - one would expect larger - for
lower tiers in the government hierarchy (Melkers and Willoughby, 2005).
These authors find, again for the U.S., that the use of performance meas
ures is more common at the county than at the municipal level. However,
they warn that this cannot be taken as an indication that smaller govern
ments are less accountable to their citizens. In fact, the opposite may be
possible, that the higher accountability of smaller governments lowers the
need for the implementation of performance measures.
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Summarizing, the evidence so far on economies of scope is largely
concentrated in the area of private sector production processes. At this
point there is no solid evidence on a relation between jurisdiction size and
budgetary processes, including higher citizen participation.
Equity and fragmentation in local government structure

In the absence of proper fiscal equalization mechanisms, fragmentation of
the local government structure may make the delivery of public services
less equitable (Warner and Hefetz, 2002). In addition, a commonly shared
hypothesis is that fiscal fragmentation may be favored as a strategy to
avoid inter-jurisdictional redistribution of local fiscal bases (Ellickson,
1971; Lewis, 1998). On the other hand, government fragmentation may
allow for better access of the poor and rural population to services tailored
to their needs, thus making the system of government more equitable.
Academic contributions to this debate have focused on the analysis
of metropolitan areas and especially on the fiscal comparison between
central metropolitan and suburban areas, mostly in the U.S. As Razin
(2000; p. 28) puts it, changes in local government organization "re-shape
the rules of the game of local development and influence inter-local dis
parities". However, Schneider (1986), in his study of metropolitan dis
parities in access to services, does not find support for the hypothesis that
fragmentation results in higher service inequality; Morgan and Mareschal
(1999) do not find either any effect of metropolitan fragmentation on
fiscal health.
Fragmentation and institutional, demographic, and geographical issues

Certain institutional aspects that may affect (restrict or encourage) further
local government fragmentation have been explored in the empirical liter
ature. Nelson (1992), focusing on the U.S. case, finds that tax and expendi
ture limitations (TELs) increase the number of special districts, which
may be created as a way to circumvent tax limits imposed upon state and
local governments via referendum. However, he does not find evidence
that other self-imposed limits to local debt or home rule clauses have any
significant impact on fragmentation.9 However, contrary to Nelson's
findings, Bowler and Donovan (2004; p. 194) most recently qualified this
finding, arguing that, "absent the pressure of ballot initiatives, TELs do
not lead (in the U.S.) to an increase in the formation of new local govern
ments". In the same vein, Lewis (1998) argues that the implementation of
Proposition 13, which imposed severe limits to the rise of property taxes
in California, did not lead to an increase in the level of local government
fragmentation in the form of additional special districts.
The impact of the overall size of the public sector on fragmentation has
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not been fully explored in the literature, in part perhaps due to the endogeneity involved in its testing. On the other hand, the form of financing does
appear to have an effect on fragmentation. Kenny and Schmidt (1994) find
that state aid to school districts was an important determinant of the great
consolidation of school districts observed between 1950 and 1980 in the
U.S. A larger role of the state in the financing of local schools reduced the
capacity of districts to differentiate the education services provided and to
sort themselves on the basis of average income in their jurisdictions.
Outside the main economic arguments, jurisdictional fragmentation
may also be affected by a myriad of institutional features such as the form
of the state (federal versus unitary), a history of decentralized govern
ment or secession of certain regions, cultural and ethnic issues, civil or
armed conflicts, and so on. But to date no empirical research has been
done on these issues. More recently, and particularly with regard to urban
municipal consolidation processes, the desire to compete in a "global city"
environment may be affecting metropolitan consolidation processes.10
On the other hand, demographic and geographical variables have tra
ditionally been used as controls in the empirical analysis of local govern
ment fragmentation. Metro area population and land area are positively
correlated and statistically significant determinants of the number of
governments in Nelson (1992), a result partially supported in Bowler and
Donovan (2004). The hypothesis behind the inclusion of these variables
is that large demographic or geographical areas may be more difficult to
manage and thus fragmentation would be efficiency enhancing. Nelson's
analysis includes additionally U.S.-specific institutional explanatory
variables not necessarily applicable to cross-country analysis.11
In summary, as we have reviewed in this section, numerous factors may
play a role explaining the level of government fragmentation encountered
in a particular country. Our challenge is now to develop an empirical
model that allows exploration of the relative influence of these explanatory
variables, a task approached in the next section.

4.

HYPOTHESES AND EMPIRICAL APPROACH

The prevailing theory on optimal government size implies that the number
of jurisdictions is a function of several factors, including importantly
the cost of production of services (and thus the potential for economies
of scale), the heterogeneity of preferences, and preferences for political
accountability. All other things equal, optimal jurisdictional size is smaller
when preferences for political accountability are taken into account. In
addition, we have discussed additional determinants of jurisdictional

Art international perspective on local government fragmentation

27

fragmentation, including institutional, geographical and demographic
variables.
Generically, we can represent the relationship between optimal jurisdic
tional size and this set of relevant variables as:
N = N(C, U(DG), P, Z),
where N is the jurisdictional size, C represents a measure of economies of
scale, U(DG) depicts the level of heterogeneity of preferences, P represents
preferences for political accountability and Z is a vector including other
institutional, geographic and demographic factors affecting jurisdictional
size.
As discussed in previous sections, the expected sign of the partial
derivatives is as follows:
dN
„ dN
AN
„
n
— > 0, — < 0, and — < 0
dC
dU
dP
Our first task in the definition of our empirical model is to further
clarify our dependent variable. As already noted above, operationalizing
the level of government fragmentation is a complex task. The literature
has favored absolute measures, such as the total number of governments,
over scaling indicators, such as the average population or geographical
area by jurisdiction. Conversely, the number of local governments for a
certain population size could be used as a relative measure of fragmenta
tion. In his study of U.S. government fragmentation, Nelson (1992) uses
the number of governments per metro area, while Bowler and Donovan
(2004) use the number of governments (again both general and specialpurpose governments) in a state at the time of a census. In exploring the
effect on fragmentation of Proposition 13 in California (which impor
tantly limited revenue collections from the property tax), Lewis (1998) also
uses total number of governments as his variable of interest.
The use of absolute measures of government fragmentation (i.e. total
number of governments) may be a reasonable empirical strategy when
a certain level of jurisdictional homogeneity can be assumed within the
sample, as in country case-studies. Our aim however is to explore these
relationships within the context of as large as possible a sample of coun
tries. This therefore requires a relative measure of fragmentation that
helps homogenize to the extent possible the individual values of our
dependent variable.
First, we should clarify what is understood as "government" or juris
diction in this context. In short, we include in our estimations all levels
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of government with service delivery responsibilities and all jurisdictions
within each level. The rationale behind this selection is that we are inter
ested in exploring whether heterogeneity of preferences for public services
may lead to further fragmentation in order to allow a better matching of
preferences with service delivery. Arguably, a country may be divided into
a large number of jurisdictions, but in the absence of elected governments
with some authority over their budgets, public service delivery may not
differ much in that system from a fully centralized service delivery system.
The level of discretion or authority over local expenditure and revenue
sources is in reality very hard to measure. In fact, fiscal decentralization
experts around the world have identified this as a major obstacle in the
analysis of the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth,
quality of service delivery, and so on. Acknowledging that the level of
fiscal autonomy of subnational government around the world varies
widely, it is to be expected that a jurisdiction with a locally elected govern
ment will have larger authority over its budget than a similar territorial
unit with de-concentrated units of the central government. Accordingly,
our analysis will attempt to control for this.
Our estimation strategy is to try different specifications of the dependent
variable. First, in line with previous contributions to the literature, we will
use the total number of jurisdictions (from elected levels of government)
as our dependent variable. In addition, as just discussed, the heterogeneity
of jurisdictions and different sizes across the world requires the use of a
relative indicator of fragmentation that allows homogenizing the values of
our dependent variable. Thus, in the subsequent model specifications we
will use as dependent variables the ratios of population and area size to the
total number of jurisdictions. To that end, all jurisdictions from elected
levels of government (including the central government) are added, and
the values of the above mentioned ratios are calculated for each country.
Lastly, we will also include in our estimations the number of levels
of government. This is an aspect of jurisdictional fragmentation that
has been largely ignored in the literature, and thus we provide a first
exploration into this issue.
The Difficulties of Measuring Economies of Scale in a Sample of Countries

In line with the standard model of optimal jurisdictional size, we would
expect the potential for economies of scale to be, other things equal, a
deterrent to high government fragmentation.12 The literature has tradi
tionally approximated the measurement of economies of scale in various
ways. Earlier studies used population as a proxy for economies of scale,
while more recent contributions have used either expenditure or produc
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tion cost data. As shown in the meta-analysis results in Gomez-Reino
and Martinez-Vazquez (2011), using population as a measure of potential
economies of scale can lead to their underestimation.
In the context of our analysis of jurisdictional fragmentation, using
population as our measure of economies of scale introduces additional
problems. For example, considering China and Luxembourg side by side,
we would have to expect (if population as our proxy for economies of
scale) lower relative levels of government fragmentation in China than
in Luxembourg, since China's large population would signal the largest
international potential for economies of scale. That is, obviously, not a
reasonable assumption. Population would seem to be therefore naturally
and directly related to the level of jurisdictional fragmentation, and it is
discarded as a valid proxy for economies of scale. This approach is also
consistent with Nelson's (1992) analysis of jurisdictional fragmentation in
metropolitan areas of the U.S., whereby population is included solely as
an environmental control variable.
Given the existence of economies of scale in services such as urban trans
portation, garbage collection or water and sanitation, ideally, one would
want to explore the functional assignments of our sample of countries and
ascertain in which of them these functions are decentralized to subnational
levels of government as an indication of potential for economies of scale.
Regrettably, few countries have formal statements of expenditure assign
ments and even where they exist, they are often no more than broad lists
of functional responsibilities with great overlap across tiers of govern
ment. In addition, collecting data on the cost elasticity of production from
service delivery at subnational levels of government for a sample of close
to 200 countries is, simply, unrealistic.
We are left with few straightforward options for variables approximat
ing the potential for economies of scale in public service delivery. The most
comprehensive analysis of the determinants of fragmentation in the U.S.
by Nelson (1992) does not include a measure of economies of scale, a clear
signal of the difficulties encountered in operationalizing this variable even
in the context of a single country case-study. The Global Competitiveness
Index (Schwab, 2010) may offer a possible avenue. Among the index sub
components, a measure of technological readiness is included. Since the
sources of economies of scale are mostly of a technological nature, they
may originate in gains from more efficient division of labor (internal econ
omies of scale), or can be derived from an expansion in the industry where
the company operates, leading to increased leverage power with suppliers.
Economies of scale may also be due to the use of more specialized inputs
of production. The latter technological dimension is measured by the GCI
technological readiness sub-index, which evaluates the capacity of an
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economy to adopt new technologies in order to improve the productivity
of the national private sector.13 The use of this measure implies assuming
that if such technologies are available to the private sector, it would be
more likely that the public sector is also introducing them in its production
processes, thus increasing their productivity.14 But we must note that even
in this case the direction on optimal scale is not necessarily clear; in partic
ular, the introduction of technological advances may allow cost reductions
even in specialized production, thus making possible the efficient delivery
of public services at smaller scales.
Allowing for Heterogeneous Preferences

The second set of variables aims to test the hypothesis that heterogeneous
preferences lead to greater jurisdictional fragmentation. This hypoth
esis is derived from Oates's standard postulate that greater preference
heterogeneity leads to smaller optimal group size for service delivery.
Heterogeneous preferences have been operationalized in practice via meas
ures of income, race, and age dispersion. In terms of income dispersion,
higher values of the Gini income inequality index should lead to diverse
preferences and thus to a higher level of jurisdictional fragmentation.
Equally, a measure of ethnic dispersion (taking into consideration race,
language, and religious dimensions) has been used to approximate het
erogeneous preferences derived from varying ethnic compositions.15 Greater
ethnic diversity is also expected to translate into a more fragmented govern
ment system that can reflect the preferences of the minorities. First, we use
the data in a recent contribution by Alesina et al. (2003), which provides
recalculated measures of the Easterly and Levine (1997) data on disaggre
gated indexes of fractionalization. To conduct a sensitivity analysis, we also
construct our own Herfindahl ethnic and linguistic fractionalization index on
the basis of data on ethnic composition collected from population statistics
(Table 2.2). Both indexes are highly correlated and their alternative inclusion
in the model estimations renders no significant differences in the results.
We also include an additional measure of heterogeneity of preferences
as an index of age dispersion. The rationale behind it is that senior citizens
may be assumed to display differentiated sets of preferences (e.g., they may
favor higher expenditure in health and lower expenditure in education as
they do not have school-age children).16
Measuring Political Accountability

Our variable of interest, political accountability, is operationalized in
various forms. The existence of elected government representatives at the
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Table 2.2

(continued)

Variable name

Max

Min

Mean

Standard
deviation

Obs.

Description

Age Hertindahl country value
Ethno linguistic
Alesinaetal.
2003
fractionalization
Herfindahl index
Language
Alesinaetal.
2003
fractionalization
index
Religion
Alesina et al.
2003
fractionalization
index
Total country
International
area in square km Database, US Census
Bureau
Income/
U.N. Wider
Several
expenditure
Database
Years
inequality
Dummy variable with value 1 for
consumption inequality data
Purchasing power United
2007
parity GDP data
Nations
HDR
Voice and
World Bank
2007
accountability
index

AHV
AleELF

0.67
0.93

0.46
0.00

0.51
0.44

0.03
0.26

218
187

AleLin

0.92

0.00

0.39

0.28

192

AleRel

0.86

0.00

0.44

0.23

202

Country
area
Gini

Conlneq
GDPpc

VAI

16,995,800

2.00

74.61

24.00

1.00

0.00

85,382

4.07

298

0.19

597,974

40.88

1,774,385

9.91

218

151

151
13,259

2.49

15,704

1.00

182

205

Source

Year

GEI

4.91

0.15

2.48

1.00

209

SubDem
Status

2

0.00

1.1

0.882

190

SubDem
Status2

0.00

7

5.08

2.93

171

Finite term

1

0.00

0.894

0.308

170

Government
effectiveness
index
Interaction term:
Subnational
elections
•Democratic
status .
(0=dictatorship,
1 =pseudo
democracy,
2=electoral
democracy)
Interaction term:
subnational
elections *Index
of legislative
competitiveness
(0=no legislature
-7=multiple
parties have seats
in parliament)
Existence of a
finite term for the
legislature

World Bank

2007

Own
calculations

2009

World Bank
and own
calculations

2006

World Bank

2006
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subnational levels of government (as opposed to appointed by central
government authorities) can be taken as a critical indicator of political
accountability since subnational officials can be removed from office if
their policies do not reflect the needs and preferences of the majority.
However, the existence of subnational elections is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for true accountability to be present. Several pseudodemocracies and even dictatorships around the world hold subnational
"elections". In these countries, the range of candidates is severely limited
to those of the party in power or political allies, and no credible political
alternatives are offered to citizens. To take into account the democratic
status of countries around the world, we interact our dummy variable
measuring the presence of subnational elections with an index of legis
lative competitiveness from the Political Institutions Database (World
Bank, 2006).
In addition, we include in our model the World Bank's Governance
Index sub-component of "voice and accountability". This indicator (with
a minimum value of 0 and a maximum of 5) aims to measure the "extent
to which citizens of a country are able to participate in the selection of
governments" (Kaufmann et al., 2008). The governance indicators col
lected by the World Bank include an additional indicator, "Government
Effectiveness", which aims to measure the capacity of subnational
bureaucracies to provide quality public services and its independence from
political pressures. Both measures cover aspects of our variable of interest
(political accountability) and offer the opportunity to reduce the endogeneity of the model by using them as a proxy for the latter. Arguably,
the "voice and accountability" indicator represents more closely citizens'
capacity to elect and exercise control over their political class, the very
essence of accountability.
A third dimension of accountability that is explored is the authority
of local representatives over tax collection and spending policies. It may
be the case that local authorities are elected but still budgets are "condi
tional" in their use, so that in reality no spending discretion is allowed.
Additionally, local authorities may not enjoy revenue raising autonomy,
which would also limit their ability to respond to local needs. We measure
this dimension in two ways. First, we include a variable measuring the
share of total expenditure conducted at the subnational level, a traditional
indicator of fiscal decentralization. Second, we include a dummy vari
able with a value of 1 if the subnational governments have authority over
taxing, spending or legislating (World Bank, 2006). Unfortunately, this
variable is only available for a limited number of countries, reducing the
number of observations importantly.
We also consider other variables that may influence the level of
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jurisdictional fragmentation. One such variable is the share of public
expenditure in GDP. However, this variable presents a clear problem of
endogeneity, as more fragmented systems of government are also more
likely to show a higher government share in GDP (Martinez-Vazquez and
Yao, 2009). Therefore this variable was not used in our final model speci
fication. A second variable is the existence of constitutional provisions
guaranteeing the provision of social services as a right of the citizenry
(with obvious fiscal and governmental implications) which may affect the
level of public sector expenditure and potential fragmentation. In the end
we were not able to code the information for the large number of countries
in our sample from the available constitutional texts in English.
Additional Institutional Hypotheses

An array of institutional variables may also affect the level of fragmen
tation of a country. The available data on political institutions offers
interesting alternatives for testing the role of institutions on jurisdictional
fragmentation. Arguably, the impact of institutional variables is likely to
extend beyond any single year and, as such, a cross-sectional analysis for a
single year will not capture the full implications of maintaining or chang
ing any critical aspect of the institutional fabric of a country. Our results
in this area should therefore be interpreted with caution.
First, we test the impact of presidential electoral arrangements (presi
dential, parliamentary or assembly elected president) on jurisdictional
fragmentation. Second, we test whether the existence of a nationalistic
party in power (arguably an advocate of unitary systems) may lead to
lower levels of fragmentation.17 As additional tests to the quality of
democracy, we introduce a variable measuring whether there is a constitu
tional limit on the number of years an executive can serve before elections
are called. Ideally, following Nelson (1992), we would have liked to
include in our analysis whether provisions exist for minimum population
sizes for new jurisdiction creation. We were unable to collect this variable
for a large enough number of countries.
Finally, anecdotal evidence seems to suggest that movements from auto
cratic to democratic systems of government release pent up pressure for
jurisdictional fragmentation. Indonesia may be a good example where the
advent of democracy unleashed a process of fragmentation (pemekaran)
that translated into almost the doubling of subnational level jurisdictions
supposedly in search of democratic spaces of representation (Imansyah
and Martinez-Vazquez, 2010). The end of armed conflicts may also lead
to such a process of new jurisdiction formation. We measure these dimen
sions with a single dummy variable with value one when a significant
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transition to a more democratic system of government (measured by an
increase in the Polity IV project index of 3 or more points) occurred in the
country over the last 10 years.
Geographic Control Variables

Arguably, country size can affect the level of government fragmentation.
Difficulties in reaching isolated populations from the political center are
a strong incentive to create subnational levels of government that can be
closer for the delivery of public services. We use country area (in square
kilometers) to measure country size. Additionally, a measure of geo
graphic accessibility is required, as countries with small land area may still
be highly fragmented if they consist of mountainous territory or display
other natural features that make accessibility difficult. Such lack of acces
sibility should lead to a preference for smaller governments that can be
closer to the citizens. Absent a better measure of accessibility, we use the
ratio of the highest to the lowest altitude in a country as a proxy for acces
sibility. Ideally, we would like to use many altitude points in every country
to evaluate their dispersion, but such information could not be obtained.
We consider alternative variables in order to control for the way geo
graphical characteristics may affect jurisdictional fragmentation. First,
we consider the geographical location of a country, such as whether it is
landlocked or coastal, using a dummy variable to measure this dimension.
Second, we include a variable denoting the continent where the country is
located. And third, we test for the impact of latitude, a geographical vari
able that has proved highly significant in previous economic analyses such
as economic growth patterns.
Estimation Methodology and Data

Our estimation approach involves two stages. First, we approach the
analysis of the determinants of the number of levels or tiers of govern
ment in a given country. Second, we test the different hypotheses on the
determinants of jurisdictional fragmentation within single levels.
The rationale for such an approach is the understanding that, although
certain simultaneity in the process of determination of the two stages is
obvious, if presented with the opportunity to define the territorial struc
ture of a country (for instance at the time of drafting the constitution), we
would expect the logical sequential order of events to be first to define the
number of tiers of government and, given that, to determine the number
of the mechanisms for the creation of new jurisdictions (or their merger)
within each of those levels.18
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As discussed in the previous section, the number of tiers of government
in a given country is a largely unexplored dimension of jurisdictional frag
mentation in the literature. By selecting the number of tiers of subnational
levels of government as the dependent variable, we observe that while
some countries have two tiers or even more, there are other countries that
have only one tier or none. Thus Tobit estimation appears to be an ade
quate estimation approach (Tobin, 1958). Because the variable is censored
at 0, in its standard mathematical expression, in terms of a latent variable
y* (Baum, 2006):
T* = A7P + p
=

'

f 0 ify*<= 0

{

>o

where Xjis a row vector of explanatory variables, p is a vector of param
eters to be estimated, and p ~ N(0,1) is the error term.
In our sample, this variable either shows zeros for those countries with
no subnational levels of government or a positive integer between 1 and 4.
Arguably, there are other alternatives to operationalize this aspect of juris
dictional fragmentation. For instance, we could have collapsed all positive
values and turned this censored variable into a binary one, but at the cost
of losing important information on the different number of tiers of subnational governments. Alternatively, we could have counted all levels of
government in the variable, including the central one, thus allowing for
the use of an ordered probit model fit, an alternative maximum likelihood
estimation method. However, the cardinal nature of the variable in the
ordered probit estimation suggests that this is a less preferred approach.19
Last, truncated data estimation methods were deemed not appropriate
since the data generation process did not present this characteristic. We
also could perhaps convert the variable into a truncated one by discarding
all observations with a value of zero (Baum, 2006), but again at the cost of
degrees of freedom and loss of information.
In order to explore the determinants of the number of subnational tiers
of governments across countries (which we believe a first in the literature),
we estimate the following equation:

L, - a 0 + P, Cj'+ P 2 U, + p 3 Pi +

: 0, Zji

+ p,

where L is the number of levels of government, C, represents economies
of scale, U, reflects the impact of heterogeneous preferences on overall
welfare, P, is our measure of political accountability, and Z7 is a vector
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of other institutional and geographical variables. The marginal effects
on the observed value L can be obtained as the product of the individual
coefficients times the probability that the latent variable value is between
a certain interval. Our interpretation of the results will focus on the
statistical significance of the coefficients and the direction (sign) of the
relationships found.
In the second stage of our estimation we turn to the analysis of the more
conventional question of jurisdictional fragmentation: explaining the
determinants of the number of jurisdictions, normalized or not by popula
tion and land area. Here we use standard OLS estimation with three alter
native dependent variables: the total number of jurisdictions, the average
population per jurisdiction, and the average land area per jurisdiction.
For simplicity, initially we assume a linear functional form for the basic
specification:
N = a0 + P,C, + M + (),/>, + 2* 0,Z,.,. + M-,
where N is the number of jurisdictions (or the average population or area
per jurisdiction, depending on the specification), C, represents economies
of scale, U, reflects the impact of heterogeneous preferences on overall
welfare, P( is our measure of political accountability, and Z/7 is a vector of
other institutional and geographical variables.
At the outset, and considering the multiple avenues through which the
levels of fragmentation of a country can be determined, our model may
leave out, due to lack of available data, critical explanatory variables
and thus suffer from omitted variable bias that leads to higher stand
ard errors. To explore this aspect we will conduct standardized Ramsey
tests. Moreover, the size of our sample (effectively around 143 observa
tions) limits the number of variables that can be included in the analy
sis. However, regional dummy variables are introduced to account for
regional unobserved fixed effects on fragmentation patterns.
In order to test for the appropriateness of the linearity assumption
for the basic specification, we plot the residuals against the suggested
predictors in early model specifications to explore for possible deviations
from linearity. This analysis suggests the need to transform several of
the variables into logarithmic form, and to opt for a quadratic form in the
relationship between population and jurisdictional fragmentation.
Both the White and Breusch-Pagan tests showed a certain amount of
heteroskedasticity as was to be expected from the nature of our crosssection sample. Accordingly, robust standard errors are calculated to
correct the heteroskedastic errors.
Summary statistics and sources for the data used in this analysis are
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provided in Table 2.2. The data have been collected from a wide variety of
sources for a cross-section of around 200 countries.

5.

ESTIMATION RESULTS

We now turn to the analysis of the results for the two sets of estimations.
Tiers of Government

The results of the estimation for the number of subnational tiers using
maximum likelihood estimation for the Tobit regression model are pre
sented in Table 2.3. From our results, it would appear that the vertical
structure of government (number of tiers) might be solely related to "size"
variables, with other institutional and preference-related variables playing
no distinctive role. In particular, we find a strong positive relationship
between population and fragmentation, defined as the number of subna
tional tiers of government. Equally, a large country area seems to increase
the probability of having more subnational levels of government. Both
results are robust to the different model specifications, even after regional
dummy variables are included.
Of the set of variables measuring heterogeneity of preferences, it would
not seem that any of them plays a significant role in this aspect of frag
mentation. Nor could we find any significant relationship between our
set of institutional variables, such as ethnic fractionalization, etc., and the
number of tiers of subnational government. Geographical fixed effects, as
captured partly by the regional dummies, show countries in other conti
nents than Europe to have a lower probability, all other things equal, of
vertical fragmentation.
Number of Governments

The estimation for three alternative measures of jurisdictional fragmen
tation (total number of jurisdictions, population average and area size
average per jurisdiction) are presented in Table 2.4. For each of these
variables, we estimate three sets of model specifications.
In the first one (Models 1, 4 and 7 respectively), we test the standard eco
nomic hypotheses of fragmentation based on the impact of economies of
scale and of heterogeneity of preferences in the level of jurisdictional frag
mentation. For this first set of models, we run Ramsey tests to search for
possible omitted variable bias.20 In addition, significant correlation was
found among some variables (especially different model specifications,
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Table 2.3

Results from the Tobit model for tiers of government

Dep. variable: number of subnational levels of government
Model 1
Population
Area
AleELF
Gini
Conlneq
GDPpc
AHV

Model 2

.091**
(.041)
.064**
(.031)
-.361
(.224)
-.004
(.005)
.144
(139)
-.058
(.058)
-.024
(1.785)

.086**
(.042)
.060*
(.031)
-.364
(.228)
-.004
(.005)
.141
(.145)
-.048
(.063)
.188
(1.894)
.006
(.021)
-.037
(.057)

.673
(1.221)
144
0.1358
-114.65
.536
(.034)

.682
(1.269)
141
0.1259
-113.25
.540
(.033)

Subnational elections*
Dem status 2
VA1
Oceania
South America
Central America
North America
Asia
Africa
Constant
Number of observations
Pseudo R-squared
Log pseudo-likelihood
Sigma
Probability > F
Notes:

0.000

0.000

Model 3
.092**
(.042)
.055*
(.029)
-.281
(.229)
.006
(.006)
.196
(.165)
-.049
(.062)
.022
(1.817)
.001
(.022)
-.084
(.058)
-.089
(.183)
-.383*
(.205)
-.535***
(.157)
-.684***
(.217)
-.386**
(.174)
-.379
(.213)
.733
(1.192)
141
0.1684
-107.75
.519
(.034)

0.000

MLE estimation. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Population, GDPpc
and Area are in logarithmic form. Europe is the reference group for the regional dummy
variables.
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively.
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Table 2.4

Results from the OLS estimation for the number ofjurisdictions
Dep. variable: log of total number
of jurisdictions

Population
(millions)
Population
squared
Area
AleELF
Gini
Conlneq
GDPpc
AHV
Subnational
elections*
Dem
status 2
VAI

Model 1

Model 2

.020***
(.003)
-.1X10"***
(0.02X10")
.384***
(.061)
-1.899***
(.583)
-.024**
(.011)
-.235
(.279)
-.140
(.146)
-4.590
(4.513)

.021***
(.003)
-.1X10"***
(0.02x10")
.266***
(.060)
-1.380**
(.539)
-.024***
(.009)
-.407
(.250)
-.249**
(.128)
-6.348
(4.095)
.145***
(.035)

.118
(.121)

Model 3

Dep. variable: log of area to
jurisdictions ratio
Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

-.006*
-.006**
.019***
-.006**
(.003)
(.003)
(.003)
(.003)
-.1X10"***
0.04X10"* 0.04X10"* 0.04X10"*
(0.02x10") (0.02X10") (0.02X10")
(0.02X10")
.292***
(.057)
2.251***
-1.392**
2.851***
2.553***
(.745)
(.711)
(.692)
(.565)
.007
.0362**
-.006
.033**
(.014)
(.016)
(015)
(.011)
.141
-.056
.166
-.211
(.345)
(.323)
(.348)
(.273)
.413*
.401**
-.324***
.181
(.186)
(212)
(.192)
(.138)
-11.792
-11.641*
-14.552**
-5.529
(7.119)
(7.041)
(6.507)
(4.317)
-.123**
-.132**
.137***
(.059)
(.055)
(.038)

.099
(.127)

-.333**
(.157)

-.333*
(.170)

Dep. variable: log of population
to jurisdictions ratio
Model 7

Model 8

.017
-.015
(.055)
(054)
.826
1.178
(.547)
(.529)
.013
.017
(.011)
(.012)
.157
.241
(.247)
(.275)
-.062
.071
(.137)
(.139)
3.932
2.635
(4.177)
(4.474)
-.143*** -.128***
(.041)
(.037)

-.116
(.133)

-.072
(.131)

Model 9

.026
(.059)
.884
(.562)
.003
(.015)
.026
(.264)
.187
(.146)
4.362
(4.281)
-.143***
(.037)

-.116
(-133)

0.67
0.000

0.71
0.000

0.26
0.000

Africa

Number of
observa
tions
R-squared
Probability > F

1.553
(2.467)
144

0.58
0.000

-4.936
(4.137)
141

0.31
0.000

0.39
0.000

-.427**
(.195)

-.357*
(.204)

0.13
0.005

0.23
0.000

*
*

7.949**
(3.612)
144

South
America
Central
America
North
America
Asia

-.235
(.203)
2.614***
(.822)
1.892***
(.521)
.305
(.565)
.856
(.728)
.701
(.572)
1.229**
(.624)
-3.118
(4.236)
141

1

6.131**
(2.762)
141

Oceania

Constant

-.238
(.198)

.806***
(.201 )
-1.531***
(.387)
-.875**
(.431)
-.805***
(.369)
.206
(.713)
-.568
(.388)
-.935**
(.442)
6.208**
(2.841)
141

907***
(.199)

Sub levels

(.195)
.789**
(.382)
.677
(.492)
.724*
(.396)
-.598
(.751)
.794*
(.417)
.948*
(.498)
6.724**
8.569*** 8.362***
(2.941)
(2.958)
(3.067)
141
141
144
0.28
0.000

OLS estimation. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. GDPpc and Area in logarithmic form. Europe is the reference group for the
regional dummy variables.
»**. *», and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively.
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both in terms of their size and signs, so no further attention was given
to this issue. We also applied the Breusch-Pagan test to our initial model
specification, with the results suggesting the presence of a certain amount
of heteroskedasticity (confirmed by the plotting of residuals against some
of the quasi-ordinal variables in the sample, such as subnational demo
cratic status). As a result, our final estimations calculated and reported
robust standard errors.
The second set of specifications (Models 2, 5 and 8 respectively) includes
proxy variables attempting to measure demand for political accountabil
ity. From the basic theoretical framework we anticipate that, all things
equal, demand for political accountability should translate into a smaller
optimal jurisdictional size, and thus lead to higher fragmentation. Finally,
in the third set of specifications (Models 3, 6 and 9 respectively) we add a
vector of geographical and institutional control variables meant to test the
robustness of the findings.
Note that none of the specifications in Table 2.4 includes a variable for
economies of scale. Regrettably, "technological readiness", the proxy for
potential for economies of scale, proved to be insignificant and did not
add to the overall explanatory power of the models; therefore the vari
able was discarded from the final specifications. As previously discussed,
the difficulties in appropriately measuring this potential dimension of
fragmentation seem insurmountable at this time.21 Of course, absent the
direct measurement of economies of scale, the variation in the level of
jurisdictional fragmentation across countries due to the different potential
for economies of scale is left in the error term, reducing the explanatory
power of the model and possibly biasing our estimates for the role by other
variables of interest. Note, however, that these effects may be minimized
to the extent that economies of scale are technologically driven and that
technology may be similarly available across countries.
In terms of the remaining set of hypotheses, we are still able to draw
important conclusions, as outlined in what follows. First, the results in
Table 2.4 show that, as expected, population and land area are positively
correlated with the level of jurisdictional fragmentation across countries.
In addition, the impact of population appears to follow a non-linear
pattern. Higher population leads to increasing levels of fragmentation, but
at a decreasing rate. This relationship holds both for absolute measures
of fragmentation (total number of jurisdictions) or relative ones (ratio of
area to number of jurisdictions). The maximum level of fragmentation is
reached at a population level of around I billion people, a level that only
India and China have reached. An alternative model specification was
tested whereby population was included as an explanatory variable in the
model in a logarithmic (as opposed to quadratic) form. The estimation
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of this specification showed that a 1 percent increase in population led
to a 0.68 percent increase in the total number of jurisdictions, a less than
proportional increase. The relationship between area and fragmentation
is equally significant. A 1 percent increase in country area leads to a 0.3
percent increase in the total number of jurisdictions in the full model speci
fication. In summary, the level of fragmentation is inelastic with respect to
population and land area, and more so for the latter than for the former.
The set of variables measuring heterogeneity of preferences also offers
statistically significant and sizable results. Our measure of ethno-linguistic
fragmentation suggests, perhaps counter-intuitively, that greater disper
sion on ethnic and linguistic groups leads to lower jurisdictional frag
mentation, both in terms of smaller number of jurisdictions and higher
average area. The result is-.very robust across model specifications and
to alternative measurements of ethno-linguistic fragmentation. A pos
sible explanation for this result is that ethno-linguistic fractionalization
is more prevalent in poorer, low-growth countries with lower quality of
government (Alesina and Spolaore, 2003). Also Aghion et al. (2002) find
that ethnic fractionalization is inversely related to quality of democracy.
It would follow then that countries with lower quality of government (less
democratic societies) and high ethno-linguistic fractionalization would be
less likely to create spaces for democratic representation with new juris
dictions. However, these are aspects which we already control for in our
model, so we are left wanting an alternative explanation. Perhaps ethnolinguistic fragmentation historically leads to resistance against further
fragmentation to preserve national or group identities. But at this stage we
have no means to validate this conjecture.
Our second variable approximating heterogeneous preferences, the age
dispersion index, displays the hypothesized sign, but it is not robust across
specifications. It would seem that greater age dispersion leads to a smaller
average jurisdictional size, but we find no statistically significant evidence
of the variable affecting the total number of jurisdictions or average popu
lation size. This result may be due to the fact that age dispersion may not
be that stable over time in each individual country.
Two other variables with unanticipated results are per capita GDP and
income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient. Our results indicate
that higher per capita GDP leads to lower levels of fragmentation in the
sample. Representation and democracy, as perhaps proxied by fragmenta
tion, are expensive endeavors and one would anticipate that they exhibit
a positive income elasticity, the opposite of what we find. However, the
result may be explained in two different ways. First, to the extent that
overall increases in per capita income tend to homogenize preferences for
public services, this result may be a reasonable one to expect. Second, a
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somewhat long list of countries have introduced forced local government
amalgamation programs in recent times,22 and most of these countries
tend to be countries with high GDP per capita. Second, the relationship
between jurisdictional fragmentation and inequality shows that increases
in inequality may lead to lower jurisdictional fragmentation overall;
this is counter-intuitive to the extent that higher income groups may
seek separation or fiscal protection through jurisdictional fragmentation.
However, these results are not robust to the insertion of regional dummies
in the model; certain world regions, such as Central America and South
America, have notoriously unequal income distributions.
Our variables approximating preferences for political accountability
are significant and display the hypothesized sign. The interaction term
formed by the existence of subnational elections and a measure of demo
cratic status or legislative competitiveness proved to be significant and
robust to different model specifications. The positive sign for this coef
ficient indicates that increased demand for political accountability leads
to higher jurisdictional fragmentation, both in terms of a greater number
of jurisdictions or smaller average area per jurisdiction.23 The World Bank
Voice and Accountability Index, a "measure of the extent to which citi
zens are able to participate in the selection of governments", displayed the
identical sign as the earlier measure of democratic quality but it was only
statistically significant when average area per jurisdiction was selected as
the dependent variable.24
We explored several other avenues through which institutional aspects
related to demand for political accountability could have impacted the
level of jurisdictional fragmentation. First, we included the number of subnational levels of government as an additional explanatory variable. We
may expect that more fragmentation - a larger number of jurisdictions - is
likely to be found in countries with more tiers of government. The reason
behind it is that intermediate levels of government are able to deliver serv
ices to local or municipal governments unable to do so due to their small
size. Lack of resort to such intermediate levels of government (i.e., county
governments in the U.S., regional districts in British Columbia, or provin
cial governments in Spain) would introduce incentives for local mergers,
and thus reduce jurisdictional fragmentation. This relationship proved to
be highly significant. As hypothesized, more levels of government led to
an increase in the overall number of jurisdictions. The results, however, do
not suggest that a similarly strong statistical relationship exists between
the number of tiers of government and the average jurisdictional size in
terms of population or land area.
Second, we tested a set of several institutional aspects that may reason
ably affect the level of fragmentation and that are proxies for democratic
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quality. These included (1) the number of years of the executive in office
(signal of quasi-democratic systems when its value exceeds 8); (2) the
constitutional existence of a finite term in office before new elections are
called; (3) whether a nationalist party is in power (more likely to advocate
a less decentralized state and possibly a less fragmented one); and (4) the
parliamentary system of the country. Of this set of variables, only the
existence of a finite term in office seemed to significantly affect the total
number of jurisdictions, but not their average size.
Third, we introduced in the analysis several available indicators meas
uring the size of the public sector in the GDP, the share of subnational
expenditure over the national total, and a variable measuring whether
fiscal authority existed over expenditure or tax policies at the local level
(for which only 29 observations were available). We could not find sig
nificant relationships between these variables and the level of jurisdic
tional fragmentation and these variables were dropped from final model
specifications.
Finally, in order to partly account for country fixed effects, we intro
duced regional dummy variables. Using Europe as the group of reference
(arguably the most fragmented region together with North America), the
dummy variables for other regions typically showed significantly lower
levels of fragmentation. The inclusion of the regional dummies did not
affect the estimates of our main variables for the different hypotheses and
added importantly to the overall explanatory value of the model.

6.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter we use a large cross-section of countries to analyze the
determinants of jurisdictional fragmentation along two dimensions: the
number of tiers of government and the number and average size of all
subnational government units. The analysis has allowed us to test the tra
ditional hypotheses in the literature on optimal jurisdictional size related
to the heterogeneity of preferences and economies of scale, and also the
implications of preferences for political accountability.
Overall, the vertical structure of government - the number of tiers of
government - is mostly related to "size" variables and not to other insti
tutional or preference-related aspects. Both population and land area size
are positively related with the number of tiers of government in a country.
This result is robust to all model specifications and dependent variables
used as measures of fragmentation.
One main additional finding from our analysis is that, in line with
the predictions of our theoretical framework, preferences for political
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accountability lead to smaller jurisdictional size and a larger number of
governments. These results are robust across different model estimations.
These results strongly suggest that accountability needs to be added to
the list of critical dimensions in the theory of optimal jurisdictional size
beyond the two arguments of economies of scale and heterogeneity of
preferences emphasized in Oates's model.
We also find strong evidence that a higher number of tiers of govern
ment leads to overall higher jurisdictional fragmentation. We hypothesize
that this is the case because when intermediate levels of government
assume subsidiary responsibilities for local governments, the smaller local
governments have less of an incentive to consolidate into larger jurisdic
tions. This finding has immediate policy consequences for countries (like,
for example, Spain) that are reconsidering the elimination of some tier
of government (the province level in Spain) and are struggling with the
administrative burdens and costs of highly fragmented local governments
(with average size under 10,000 residents).
In our empirical analysis we do less well in testing the validity of the
two traditional arguments behind optimal jurisdiction size of economies
of scale and heterogeneity of preferences. Despite the strong theoretical
case, the set of variables used to approximate heterogeneous preferences
lead to mixed results regarding the level of fragmentation. However, in
some cases, although the variable proposed may certainly be reflective
of heterogeneous preferences, other interfering variables may affect the
causality of the relationship sought, as seems to be the case with ethnolinguistic fragmentation. Of course, the results may also hide the inherent
difficulty with measuring heterogeneous preferences correctly. More acute
measuring difficulties have barred us altogether from testing the role of
economies of scale in jurisdictional fragmentation.
To conclude, we must note that our cross-sectional analysis is limited
in several other respects. For example, many of the explanatory variables
we use may actually exert their influence over the process of creation
or merger of jurisdictions over time, and thus the observed influence is
likely to depend on whether enough time has passed since the change in
the explanatory variable. These processes could be observed in a panel
dataset but remain hidden in cross-sectional analysis. Thus, ideally,
future research will revisit many of the questions examined in this
chapter using panel information. Our analysis underlines also the need
to continue to explore new avenues for the measurement of economies of
scale on subnational service delivery, a critical aspect that the empirical
literature, including our contribution, has not yet been able to address
adequately.
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NOTES
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

6.

7.

8.

9.
10.
11.
12.

Experiences in some countries (e.g., Canada) show that total government costs after
consolidation may actually have increased, at least in the short term (Sancton, 2008;
Deller, 1998). Several reasons are behind those results: for example, difficulties in
retrenching public servants due to labor agreements, or salaries that are brought up (or
equalized) to the higher level observed pre-merger.
Political opposition and institutional friction may help explain why voluntary merger
programs in countries like Peru and Spain have failed to produce substantial results
(Herrero et al., 2010; Bosch and Suarez-Pandiello, 2008).
However, the theoretical linkages between economic growth and the decentralization of
expenditure still await more conclusive empirical evidence (see Martinez-Vazquez and
McNab, 2003).
Contrary to his expectations, Nelson also finds that greater racial homogeneity
(assumed to be a reflection of lower preference heterogeneity) leads to higher fragmen
tation, a surprising result.
It is argued that local government production functions present economies of scope,
that is, that the output from the joint production of local public goods or services is
greater than the output obtained with two separate processes, using the same amount
of input (Panzar and Willig, 1977).
County formation in several of the U.S. states, for instance, has been particularly
determined by this. Historical records from Kentucky and Georgia show that county
boundaries were drawn ensuring no citizen resided more than a day's ride from the
county seat. Considering the strong historical inertia of jurisdictional formation, con
stituents' proximity to local governments may have been the single most important
determinant of jurisdictional fragmentation.
A preference for proximity to institutions governing the management of common
services may be behind, for example, the widespread creation of homeowner associa
tions in the U.S. The latter are truly miniature local private governments providing
services traditionally under the responsibility of county governments (such as water
supply, garbage collection, etc.). Although the creation of such associations is often
due to legal requirements of urban site development, they also arise spontaneously
and, in any case, have expanded enormously over the last 20 years, representing now
nearly 20% of American dwellers. Across the board, the services provided by these
associations, and the characteristics of such services do not differ greatly from those
previously offered by elected governments, although differences can be found at the
margin.
In light of the small statistical significance of a single vote, a large literature has devel
oped attempting to explain why individuals vote at all (especially considering the cost
of voting is not negligible), the so-called "voting paradox". Explanations have included
a desire to maintain democracy (Downs, 1957), or even the exercise of a sense of duty
(Riker and Ordeshook, 1968). The general conclusion of this literature is that, despite
the weight carried by the alternative explanations, the paradox remains largely unre
solved (Blais and Young, 1999).
Home rule is defined in Nelson (1992) as the allocation of significant autonomy to local
governments in carrying out local functions.
See, for example, the case of Toronto discussed in Sancton (2008).
These include whether a referendum or majority approval is required for a territory to
be annexed to a city or for the consolidation of two or more jurisdictions.
We must note here that there should be a certain degree of endogeneity between
observed levels of fragmentation and economies of scale. If economies of scale should
be expected to lead to lower fragmentation, it is also true that higher fragmentation
should lead to observed lower economies of scale. Potentially, the endogeneity problem
is properly addressed by using instrumental variables for economies of scale, as those
discussed in this section, that can be considered truly exogenous.
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13. The measure is a composite one, including values on aspects such as availability of new
technologies, firm-level technology absorption, legal ICT framework, FD1 and technol
ogy transfer, mobile and internet coverage, and personal computers per capita.
14. However, there can be important differences between the private and public sectors in
their ability to incorporate new technologies. In particular, the public sector may suffer
from Baumol's disease due to the over presence of labor intensive production processes,
and simply witness a rise in salaries in response to productivity increases in the private
sector.
15. For example, Martinez-Vazquez et al. (1997) use the share of minorities over the total
population in their analysis of the impact of race dispersion on school district consoli
dation in the U.S.
16. But these issues are not necessarily well defined. For example, senior citizens should
care about their house values and in general one may expect a link, as has been
found in the U.S., between school quality and housing values; senior citizens may
also care for the quality of education received by their grandchildren attending local
schools.
17. As an example of the inter-temporal caveat mentioned above, if a nationalistic party
has just been elected, despite its ideological leanings, it might not be able to affect the
jurisdictional organization of the country unless it remains in power for an extended
period of time. From that point of view, this variable is less likely to be significant in
cross-sectional analyses.
18. For example, the 1978 Spanish Constitution only defined the different levels of govern
ment (regional, provincial, municipal). The Organic Law regulating this constitutional
aspect established that in instances where regions are formed by just one province, the
provincial level of government is subsumed into the regional one as there is perfect
overlap. The number of regions eventually created, and the number of municipalities
existing currently in Spain is the result of an institutional process where most forces
considered in this chapter were at play. To date the Constitution in Spain has not been
amended to include the names of the regions in its articles.
19. We would expect that the number of subnational tiers of government in a given country
also depends on the number of tiers that already exist. It would become more difficult to
add another tier if a relatively high number of subnational levels of government already
exists. Thus, the variable is non-ordinal in nature.
20. We used both linktest and ovtest Stata commands, with both tests supporting the
hypothesis of no omitted variables in the model.
21. Ideally, future research will include information on the "true value" of economies of
scale for local services, that is, the true value of the cost elasticity of production.
22. Among other countries, that list includes Denmark, Sweden, Poland, Chile, Czech
Republic, South Korea, United Kingdom, and most recently Greece and Italy.
23. It could be argued that this relationship may be endogenous, and that in more jurisdictionally fragmented countries citizens are more participative and more likely to
demand enhanced political accountability. However, that may not necessarily be
the case. As already mentioned above, Lowery and Lyons (1989) find no evidence
of better information levels of citizens at lower levels of government. In any case, it
would seem that the construction of the interaction term should help dispel doubts
on the possible endogeneity. The use of an independent assessment of democratic
quality and of an index of legislative competitiveness also independent from the ter
ritorial organization of the country should diminish the possible problem of double
causation.
24. Note that the variable approximating built up demands for jurisdictional fragmenta
tion that may have been released via recent advances to the democratic quality of
system of government proved to be non-significant.
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